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Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency?

机译:企业政治贡献:投资还是代理?

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摘要

We examine corporate contributions to political candidates in national level elections in the United States from 1991 to 2004. We find that firms that donate have poor operating characteristics and that donations are negatively correlated with future excess returns. An increase in donations of $10,000 is associated with a reduction in excess returns of 7.7 basis points. When we instrument for donations, we find an even stronger negative association between donations and returns. We find that worse corporate governance is associated with larger donations and, through its impact on donations, leads to worse excess returns. When we try to isolate instances in which donations may lead to better returns, we find no support for the hypothesis that political donations represent an investment in political capital. Taken together, our results suggest that political donations are symptomatic of an agency problem.
机译:我们研究了1991年至2004年在美国举行的国家级选举中企业对政治候选人的贡献。我们发现,捐赠的公司经营状况较差,捐赠与未来的超额收益负相关。捐款增加$ 10,000会使超额收益减少7.7个基点。当我们对捐赠进行计量时,我们发现捐赠与回报之间的负相关性甚至更高。我们发现,较差的公司治理与更大的捐赠相关联,并且通过其对捐赠的影响,导致更糟糕的超额收益。当我们试图分离出捐赠可以带来更好回报的情况时,我们找不到支持政治捐赠代表对政治资本的投资这一假设的支持。两者合计,我们的结果表明政治捐赠是代理问题的征兆。

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  • 来源
  • 会议地点 Chengdu(CN);Chengdu(CN)
  • 作者单位

    Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota 321 19th Avenue South, Room 3-122 Minneapolis, MN 55455;

    Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota 321 19th Avenue South, Room 3-122 Minneapolis, MN 55455;

    Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota 321 19th Avenue South, Room 3-122 Minneapolis, MN 55455;

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  • 中图分类 财政、金融;
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