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首页> 外文会议>2007 China International Conference in Finance >Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract
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Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract

机译：合同财务困境的最佳解决方案

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We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by contract as opposed to exclusively rely on state intervention. We characterize which financial contracts are optimal depending on investor protection against fraud, and how e.cient is the resulting resolution of financial distress. We find that when investor protection is strong, issuing a convertible debt security to a large, secured creditor who has the exclusive right to reorganize or liquidate the firm yields the first best. Conversion of debt into equity upon default allows contracts to collateralize the whole firm to that creditor, not just certain physical assets, thereby inducing him to internalize the upside from e.cient reorganization. Concentration of liquidation rights on such creditor avoids costly inter-creditor conflicts. When instead investor protection is weak, the only feasible debt structure consists of standard foreclosure rights, even if it induces over-liquidation. The normative implications are that lifting legal restrictions on floating charge financing, convertibles and concentration of liquidation rights, and increasing investor protection against fraud should improve the efficiency of resolutions of financial distress.
机译：我们从理论上研究了当事方通过合同有效解决财务困境的可能性，而不是仅仅依靠国家干预。我们根据投资者对欺诈的保护来确定哪种金融合同是最佳的，以及由此产生的解决财务危机的效率如何。我们发现，在强有力的投资者保护下，向拥有重组或清算公司专有权的大型有担保债权人发行可转换债务担保的收益率最高。债务违约时将债务转换为权益，使合同可以将整个公司抵押给该债权人，而不仅仅是某些有形资产，从而促使他从有效的重组中内部化上行空间。将清算权集中在这种债权人上可以避免代价高昂的债权人之间的冲突。相反，当投资者保护薄弱时，唯一可行的债务结构包括标准止赎权，即使这会导致过度清算。规范含义是，取消对浮动抵押融资，可转换债券和清算权集中的法律限制，以及增强投资者对欺诈的保护，应会提高解决财务危机的效率。

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