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首页> 外文会议>2008 China international conference in finance >The effect of bond IPOs on banks' informational rents
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The effect of bond IPOs on banks' informational rents

机译：债券首次公开发行对银行信息租金的影响

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Modern corporate finance theory argues that, although bank monitoring is beneficial to borrowers, the private information that banks gain from monitoring lets them "holdup "borrowers for higher interest rates. In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for this information hold-up cost. Since new information about a firm's creditworthiness is revealed at the time of its first issue in the public bond market, it follows that after firms undertakes their bond IPO, banks with an exploitable information advantage will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards, in particular for the firms that are revealed to be safe. We test this by comparing banks' loan pricing policies before and after borrowers gain access to public debt markets, and use a matched-sample methodology to account for the endogeneity of the sample of bond IPO firms. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms are able to borrow from banks at lower interest rates after they issue for the first time in the public bond market and that the magnitude of these savings is economically significant for firms whose bond IPO is rated investment grade. We also find supporting evidence for our assumption that new information is revealed about the firm at the time of its bond IPO. Finally, we find that it is costly to firms, even to those whose bond IPO is rated investment grade, to enter the public bond market because they pay higher underwriting costs on their IPO bonds and because their IPO bonds are subject to underpricing when they first trade in the secondary bond market. These costs may be a reason why not all firms choose to enter the public bond market, despite the aforementioned benefits of accessing this funding source.
机译：现代公司融资理论认为，尽管银行监管对借款人有利，但银行从监管中获得的私人信息可以使他们“扣押”借款人以获得更高的利率。在本文中，我们寻求有关此信息保留成本的经验证据。由于有关公司信誉的新信息是在公共债券市场上首次发行时披露的，因此，在公司进行债券IPO之后，具有可利用信息优势的银行将被迫向下调整其贷款利率，特别是对于那些被证明是安全的公司。通过比较借款人进入公共债务市场之前和之后银行的贷款定价政策，并使用匹配样本方法来解释债券IPO公司样本的内生性，我们对此进行了测试。根据我们的假设，我们发现企业在公共债券市场首次发行后能够以较低的利率向银行借款，而这些储蓄的规模对于其债券IPO被定为投资级的企业具有重大的经济意义。 。我们还为我们的假设提供了支持性证据，即在债券发行时会披露有关该公司的新信息。最后，我们发现，即使对于那些将债券IPO评级为投资级的公司而言，进入公共债券市场也很昂贵，因为它们为IPO债券支付了更高的承销成本，并且因为他们的IPO债券在首次发行时就受到定价偏低的影响。二级债券市场的交易。尽管有获得融资来源的上述好处，但这些成本可能是为什么并非所有公司都选择进入公共债券市场的原因。

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