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首页> 外文会议>2009 China international conference in finance >Option Backdating and Board Oversight: Evidence from Firms Interlocked with Backdating Investigation Targets
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Option Backdating and Board Oversight: Evidence from Firms Interlocked with Backdating Investigation Targets

机译：期权回溯和董事会监督：与回溯调查目标相关联的公司提供的证据

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摘要

We examine the role of directors in the option backdating scandal. We show that the initial announcement of a company coming under backdating investigation generates significantly negative abnormal returns to firms director-interlocked with the investigation target. The announcement returns are more negative when interlocking directors sit on the investigation target's compensation committee and less negative when interlocked companies have stronger corporate governance and better management in place. These results suggest that investors hold directors at least partially responsible for backdating, and its revelation prompts the market to discredit involved directors and downgrade the governance quality of other companies they serve. We also find that the negative reaction is not limited to interlocked companies that may have backdated options themselves, which implies that the poor judgment and lax monitoring of interlocking directors may contribute to other agency problems. Consistent with this, we find evidence of excessive CEO compensation and more aggressive earnings management at the interlocked companies.
机译：我们研究了董事在期权回溯丑闻中的作用。我们显示，一家公司进行追溯调查的最初公告会给与调查目标联锁的公司产生显着的负异常收益。当环环相扣的董事坐在调查对象的薪酬委员会上时，公告收益更大，而当环环相扣的公司拥有更强大的公司治理和更完善的管理时，公告收益则较小。这些结果表明，投资者至少对董事负有追溯责任，而这一启示促使市场抹黑了参与董事的声誉，并降低了他们所服务的其他公司的治理质量。我们还发现，负面反应不仅限于互惠公司本身可能具有过时的选择权，这意味着对互锁董事的判断不力和监督松懈可能会导致其他代理问题。与此相符的是，我们发现有证据表明，联锁公司存在过多的首席执行官薪酬和更激进的收益管理。

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