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首页> 外文会议>2012 IEEE 5th International conference on management engineering amp; technology of statistics >Bimatrix Emotional Game Model and Evolutionary Analysis under Non-expected Utility Taking for example thief and guard game
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Bimatrix Emotional Game Model and Evolutionary Analysis under Non-expected Utility Taking for example thief and guard game

机译：非预期效用下的Bimatrix情感博弈模型与演化分析以小偷与后卫博弈为例

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摘要

Aim at limitations to the hypothesis that the players are rational in traditional economic game,based on RDEU theory,the paper establishes Non-expected Utility Bimatrix Emotional game model containing the players' emotional preference by the introduction of emotional factors.Thief and guard bimatrix game,for example,makes the evolutionary analysis of Nash equilibrium,and the result shows that the equilibrium state of the game is related to the players' emotions and the emotional change.
机译：针对传统经济博弈中玩家是理性的假设的局限性，基于RDEU理论，本文通过引入情感因素，建立了包含玩家情感偏好的非预期效用Bimatrix情感博弈模型。例如，对纳什均衡进行了进化分析，结果表明游戏的均衡状态与玩家的情绪和情绪变化有关。

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