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首页> 外文会议>2012 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Logistics >Design and analysis of optimal incentive contracts between fourth-party and third-party logistics providers
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Design and analysis of optimal incentive contracts between fourth-party and third-party logistics providers

机译：第四方与第三方物流供应商之间最佳激励合同的设计与分析

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摘要

Recent development in logistics has led to wide use of fourth-party logistics (4PL) and third-party logistics (3PL) service providers. Given the increase of the supply chain complexity and growth of intense competition, these logistics service providers (LSPs) face increasing challenges. A viable way is to cooperate. This paper aims to apply the principal-agent theory to the logistics industry by studying the horizontal cooperation between 4PL and 3PL providers through the use of incentive contracts. In contrast with traditional economic literature, compensation in this case is a combination of a fixed payment and a bonus based on the performances of the 3PL providers, in terms of service delivery rate and customer satisfaction level, which are industry specific. The problem is modeled as a risk-neutral 4PL provider hires multiple riskaverse 3PL providers to conduct different logistics tasks involved in a project. The goal of this paper is to study the design of optimal contracts that balance the incentives and risks of the 3PL providers from the perspectives of 4PL provider, so that both them can achieve maximized profits.
机译：物流的最新发展导致广泛使用第四方物流（4PL）和第三方物流（3PL）服务提供商。随着供应链复杂性的增加和竞争的加剧，这些物流服务提供商（LSP）面临着越来越多的挑战。一种可行的方式是合作。本文旨在通过运用激励合同研究4PL和3PL提供者之间的横向合作，将委托代理理论应用于物流行业。与传统的经济学文献相反，在这种情况下，补偿是固定支付和基于3PL提供者的表现的奖金的结合，在服务交付率和客户满意度方面，这是特定于行业的。问题被建模为风险中立的4PL提供者雇用了多个规避风险的3PL提供者来执行项目中涉及的不同后勤任务。本文的目的是从4PL提供者的角度研究平衡3PL提供者的激励和风险的最优合同的设计，从而使他们都能获得最大的利润。

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