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首页> 外文会议>2013 Sixth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering >Over-Determinate and Incomplete Contract: Incentive Contract Based on Rabin Motivation Fairness Model
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Over-Determinate and Incomplete Contract: Incentive Contract Based on Rabin Motivation Fairness Model

机译：超额确定和不完全合同：基于拉宾动机公平模型的激励合同

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摘要

When the agent has the motivation fairness preference, the principal of sufficient statistics advocated by the classical contract theory is no longer tenable. By incorporating Rabin motivation fairness model into the classical contract theory, we draw two conclusions: Firstly the optimal contract is over-determinate. That is to say, the optimal incentive contract based on complete information should not only reflect the agent's efforts, but also the external random factors, and agent gets the "pay for luck". Secondly the optimal contract is incomplete. That is to say, even though the principal can adopt full supervision on the agent without any cost, he should give up full supervision.
机译：当主体具有动机公平偏好时，经典合同理论所倡导的足够统计的原理就不再成立了。通过将拉宾动机公平模型纳入经典契约理论，我们得出两个结论：首先，最优契约是超定的。就是说，基于完整信息的最优激励契约不仅应反映代理人的努力，而且还应反映外部的随机因素，代理人获得“运气”。其次，最优合同是不完整的。也就是说，即使委托人可以免费对代理人进行全程监督，他也应该放弃全程监督。

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