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Chosen ciphertext Simple Power Analysis on software 8-bit implementation of ring-LWE encryption

机译:环形LWE加密软件8位实现的选择密文简单功率分析

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Post-quantum cryptographic schemes have been developed in response to the rise of quantum computers. Fortunately, several schemes have been developed with quantum resistance. However, it is not surprising that implementations of post-quantum cryptographic schemes are vulnerable to Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks because post-quantum cryptographic schemes will require implementation on the same platforms which are widely used in the industrial field. SCA attack method and their countermeasures for code-based post-quantum cryptosystem, such as McEliece, have been investigated. Unfortunately, the investigation of the ring-LWE problem in terms of SCA is as yet insufficient. There has only been limited research on the side-channel vulnerabilities of lattice-based implementations. In this paper, we propose the first Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack on the ring-LWE encryption scheme. The proposed attack exploits the chosen ciphertext and the vulnerability associated with the modular addition, which is applicable when a ring-LWE encryption scheme operates on 8-bit microcontroller devices. We also identify the vulnerability associated with the modular addition operation of 8-bit implementation. When operating a ring-LWE encryption scheme on an 8-bit device, the secret key can be revealed via this vulnerability using the proposed chosen-ciphertext SPA attack.
机译:为了响应量子计算机的兴起,已经开发了后量子密码方案。幸运的是,已经开发了几种具有量子电阻的方案。但是,不足为奇的是,后量子密码方案的实现容易受到侧信道分析(SCA)攻击,因为后量子密码方案将需要在工业领域广泛使用的相同平台上实施。研究了基于代码的后量子密码系统(例如McEliece)的SCA攻击方法及其对策。不幸的是,关于SCA的ring-LWE问题的研究还不够。关于基于网格的实现的侧通道漏洞仅进行了有限的研究。在本文中,我们提出了对ring-LWE加密方案的首次简单功率分析(SPA)攻击。拟议的攻击利用了选定的密文和与模块化附加功能相关的漏洞,当环LWE加密方案在8位微控制器设备上运行时,该漏洞将适用。我们还确定了与8位实现的模块化加法运算相关的漏洞。在8位设备上使用Ring-LWE加密方案时,可以使用建议的密文SPA攻击通过此漏洞显示秘密密钥。

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