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首页> 外文会议>2017 3rd International Conference on Information Management >Accounting conservatism, debt covenants, and information asymmetry
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Accounting conservatism, debt covenants, and information asymmetry

机译：会计保守主义，债务契约和信息不对称

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This paper examines the relationship between accounting conservatism, debt covenants, and information asymmetry around the global financial crisis. This relationship plays a pivotal role to understand the interactive behavior of accounting and economic data which influencing the agency problem and information asymmetry. Data of non-financial companies listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange is used, a sample 139 companies of 12 firm years from 2002 to 2013 is selected, and divided this data into two groups - pre and post financial crisis. It is concluded that during the financial crisis the relationship between conservatism and debt covenants become stronger, which increases the information asymmetry and the agency problem. Additionally, a relationship between the income and conservatism is reversed with increasing/decreasing liquidity and change in income which leads to higher information asymmetry and the agency problem.
机译：本文研究了围绕全球金融危机的会计保守主义，债务契约和信息不对称之间的关系。这种关系在理解影响代理问题和信息不对称的会计和经济数据的交互行为方面起着关键作用。使用在巴基斯坦证券交易所上市的非金融公司的数据，从2002年至2013年的12个公司年中选择了139个公司样本，并将这些数据分为两组：金融危机发生前后。可以得出结论，在金融危机期间，保守主义与债务契约之间的关系变得更加牢固，这加剧了信息不对称和代理问题。另外，随着流动性和收入的增加/减少，收入和保守主义之间的关系被逆转，这导致更高的信息不对称性和代理问题。

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