• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>20th European conference on artificial intelligence >A Protocol Based on a Game-Theoretic Dilemma to Prevent Malicious Coalitions in Reputation Systems
【24h】

A Protocol Based on a Game-Theoretic Dilemma to Prevent Malicious Coalitions in Reputation Systems

机译：基于博弈论困境的防止信誉系统恶意联盟的协议

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In decentralized and open systems, a large number of agents interact and make collective decisions in order to share resources. As those systems are open, the presence of malicious agents needs to be considered. A way to deal with such agents in a decentralized fashion is to use reputation systems. But, as reputation systems are based on the aggregation of local trust between the agents, they are vulnerable to malicious coalitions, particularly to self-promotion based on false identities. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach to prevent such manipulations. Its main feature is that honest agents use in turn a false-name manipulation to fool malicious agents and to drive them into a dilemma. We show that the best response to that dilemma in terms of mixed strategy equilibrium leads the malicious agents to give up most of their manipulations.
机译：在分散和开放的系统中，大量代理交互并做出集体决策以共享资源。由于这些系统是开放的，因此需要考虑恶意代理的存在。以分散方式处理此类代理的一种方法是使用信誉系统。但是，由于信誉系统基于代理之间的本地信任的聚合，因此它们容易受到恶意联盟的攻击，特别是基于虚假身份的自我宣传。在本文中，我们提出了一种博弈论方法来防止这种操纵。它的主要特征是诚实的代理人依次使用假名操纵来欺骗恶意代理人并使他们陷入困境。我们证明，在混合策略均衡方面对这种困境的最佳响应会导致恶意代理放弃其大部分操纵。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号