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首页> 外文会议>4th International Conference on Cryptology in India; Dec 8-10, 2003; New Delhi, India >Side Channel Attack on Ha-Moon's Countermeasure of Randomized Signed Scalar Multiplication
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Side Channel Attack on Ha-Moon's Countermeasure of Randomized Signed Scalar Multiplication

机译：侧通道攻击Ha-Moon的随机有符号标量乘法对策

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摘要

Side channel attacks (SCA) are serious attacks on mobile devices. In SCA, the attacker can observe the side channel information while the device performs the cryptographic operations, and he/she can detect the secret stored in the device using such side channel information. Ha-Moon proposed a novel countermeasure against side channel attacks in elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC). The countermeasure is based on the signed scalar multiplication with randomized concept, and does not pay the penalty of speed. Ha-Moon proved that the countermeasure is secure against side channel attack theoretically, and confirmed its immunity experimentally. Thus Ha-Moon's countermeasure seems to be very attractive. In this paper we propose a novel attack against Ha-Moon's countermeasure, and show that the countermeasure is vulnerable to the proposed attack. The proposed attack utilizes a Markov chain for detecting the secret. The attacker determines the transitions in the Markov chain using side channel information, then detects the relation between consecutive two bits of the secret key, instead of bits of the secret key as they are. The use of such relations drastically reduces the search space for the secret key, and the attacker can easily reveal the secret. In fact, around twenty observations of execution of the countermeasure are sufficient to detect the secret in the case of the standard sizes of ECC. Therefore, Ha-Moon's countermeasure is not recommended for cryptographic use.
机译：侧信道攻击（SCA）是对移动设备的严重攻击。在SCA中，攻击者可以在设备执行加密操作时观察到辅助信道信息，并且他/她可以使用此类辅助信道信息来检测存储在设备中的机密。 Ha-Moon提出了一种针对椭圆曲线密码系统（ECC）中的边通道攻击的新对策。该对策基于具有随机概念的带符号标量乘法，并且不会影响速度。 Ha-Moon从理论上证明了该对策是安全的，并且在实验上证实了其免疫力。因此，Ha-Moon的对策似乎很有吸引力。在本文中，我们针对Ha-Moon的对策提出了一种新颖的攻击，并表明该对策容易受到所提议的攻击的影响。提出的攻击利用马尔可夫链来检测机密。攻击者使用边信道信息确定Markov链中的过渡，然后检测秘密密钥的连续两位而不是原来的秘密密钥之间的关系。这种关系的使用极大地减少了秘密密钥的搜索空间，并且攻击者可以容易地揭示秘密。实际上，在标准大小的ECC情况下，大约有20项对策执行的观察结果足以检测到机密。因此，不建议将Ha-Moon的对策用于加密。

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