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Optimal Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Incomplete Information

机译:信息不完全的代理商的最优协商策略

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摘要

This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of anegotiation depends on many parameters―including the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy. Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Moreover, we list the conditions for convergence when both agents use their respective optimal strategies and study the effect of time on negotiation outcome.
机译:本文分析了两个竞争性代理商之间自动谈判的过程,这些竞争者的截止日期确定且对手信息不完整。一般而言,谈判的结果取决于许多参数,包括代理商的偏好,他们的保留限制,他们对时间的态度以及他们使用的策略。尽管在最现实的情况下,业务代表不可能为其对手获得有关这些参数中每个参数的完整信息,但业务代表具有与其中一些参数有关的部分信息并不少见。在这种不确定性下,我们的目标是确定代理商如何利用其可用信息来选择最佳策略。在此,尤其要考虑时间可能影响协商的所有可能方式来确定最佳策略。此外,我们列出了当两个代理使用各自的最佳策略时的收敛条件,并研究了时间对谈判结果的影响。

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