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首页> 外文会议>9th World conference on transport research (9th WCTR) >QUALITY INCENTIVES PAY-OFF?
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QUALITY INCENTIVES PAY-OFF?

机译：质量激励措施？

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摘要

Intermediaries ascertain vessel quality in shipping markets. Thus, the classification societiesset minimum quality requirements for trading vessels. Minimum class requirements do notdifferentiate between high quality and normal quality vessels. This reduces shippers’willingness to offer higher freight rates for high quality vessels since they cannot identifythese vessels.In this paper, we exploit theories on asymmetric information and incentive contracts to induce"flagging" of vessel quality. We analyse both how self-selection and credible signalling ofvessel quality may be used to overcome asymmetric information.The object in this paper, is to identify contract requirements that may induce owners toincrease vessel quality .We suggest charter contracts that allow shipowners to implicitlysignal vessel quality. Shippers may use contracts that induce self-selection by operators incharter markets. Ports also may use pricing strategies to induce self-selection among shipoperators.
机译：中介机构确定运输市场中的船只质量。因此，船级社设定了贸易船的最低质量要求。最低等级要求在高质量和正常质量的容器之间没有区别。由于无法识别高质量的船只，这降低了托运人提供更高运费的意愿。在本文中，我们利用不对称信息和激励合同的理论来诱使船只质量“下降”。我们分析了如何使用自我选择和可信的信号质量来克服不对称信息。本文的目的是确定可能导致船东提高船舶质量的合同要求。我们建议租船合同允许船东隐含信号质量。托运人可能会使用合同，促使经营者在包机市场进行自我选择。港口还可以使用定价策略在船东之间进行自我选择。

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