首页> 外文会议>A safer space for a safer world >SOFTWARE-BASED SAFETY SYSTEMS IN SPACE: LEARNING FROM OTHER DOMAINS
【24h】

SOFTWARE-BASED SAFETY SYSTEMS IN SPACE: LEARNING FROM OTHER DOMAINS

机译:在空间中基于软件的安全系统:从其他域中学习

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

Increasing complexity and new emerging capabilitiesrnfor manned and unmanned missions have been thernhallmark of the past decades of space exploration. Onernof the drivers in this process was the ever increasing usernof software and software-intensive systems tornimplement system functions necessary to therncapabilities needed. The course of technologicalrnevolution suggests that this development will continuernwell into the future with a number of challenges for thernsafety community some of which shall be discussed inrnthis paper.rnThe current state of the art reveals a number ofrnproblems with developing and assessing safety criticalrnsoftware which explains the reluctance of the spacerncommunity to rely on software-based safety measures tornmitigate hazards. Among others, usually lack ofrntrustworthy evidence of software integrity in allrnforeseeable situations and the difficulties to integraternsoftware in the traditional safety analysis framework arerncited.rnExperience from other domains and recentrndevelopments in modern software developmentrnmethodologies and verification techniques are analysedrnfor the suitability for space systems and an avionicsrnarchitectural framework (see STANAG 4626) for thernimplementation of safety critical software is proposed.rnThis is shown to create among other features thernpossibility of numerous degradation modes enhancingrnoverall system safety and interoperability ofrncomputerized space systems. It also potentiallyrnsimplifies international cooperation on a technical levelrnby introducing a higher degree of compatibility.rnAs software safety cannot be tested or argued into arnsystem in hindsight, the development process andrnespecially the architecture chosen are essential tornestablish safety properties for the software used tornimplement safety functions. The core of the safetyrnargument revolves around the separation of differentrnfunctions and software modules from each other byrnminimal coupling of functions and credible separationrnmechanisms in the architecture combined with rigorousrndevelopment methodologies for the software itself.
机译:载人和无人飞行任务的复杂性和新出现的能力一直是过去几十年太空探索的标志。在此过程中,驱动程序的唯一一项是不断增长的软件和软件密集型系统用户,以实现所需功能所需的系统功能。技术进步的过程表明,这种发展将持续到未来,对安全界将面临许多挑战,其中一些挑战将在本文中进行讨论。当前的最新技术揭示了开发和评估安全关键软件的许多问题,这说明了不愿意隔离社区依靠基于软件的安全措施消除危害。其中,通常会在可预见的情况下缺乏可靠的软件完整性证据,并且难以将软件集成到传统的安全分析框架中。从其他领域的经验以及现代软件开发的最新发展,分析了方法学和验证技术对空间系统和航空电子体系结构框架的适用性。 (参见STANAG 4626)提出了安全关键软件的实施方案。这显示出具有许多降级模式的可能性,从而增强了整个系统的安全性以及计算机空间系统的互操作性。通过引入更高程度的兼容性,它也有可能在技术水平上简化国际合作。由于事后看来无法对软件安全性进行测试或争论,因此开发过程以及特别是所选择的体系结构对于建立用于破坏安全功能的软件的安全性至关重要。安全论证的核心是通过最小化功能耦合和体系结构中可靠的分离机制以及针对软件本身的严格开发方法,将不同的功能和软件模块彼此分离。

著录项

  • 来源
  • 会议地点 Versailles(FR)
  • 作者

    Michael Klicker; Henrik Putzer;

  • 作者单位

    techcos GmbH, Leopoldstra?e 244, 80807 Munich, Germany, email: klicker@techcos.de;

    techcos GmbH, Leopoldstra?e 244, 80807 Munich, Germany, email: putzer@techcos.de;

  • 会议组织
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号