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首页> 外文会议>Advances in cryptology-CRYPTO 2009 >Privacy-Enhancing Auctions Using Rational Cryptography
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Privacy-Enhancing Auctions Using Rational Cryptography

机译：使用理性密码术提高隐私的拍卖

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摘要

We consider enhancing with privacy concerns a large class of auctions, which include sealed-bid single-item auctions but also general multi-item multi-winner auctions, our assumption being that bidders primarily care about monetary payoff and secondarily worry about exposing information about their type to other players and learning information about other players' types, that is, bidders are greedy then paranoid. To treat privacy explicitly within the game theoretic context, we put forward a novel hybrid utility model that considers both monetary and privacy components in players' payoffs.rnWe show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement any given ex interim individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By "ex interim individually strictly rational" we mean that, given its type and before making its move, each player has a strictly positive expected utility. By "approximately implement" we mean that, under cryptographic assumptions, running the protocol is a computational Nash equilibrium with a payoff profile negligibly close to the original equilibrium.
机译：我们认为，与隐私相关的问题会增加一大类拍卖，包括密封的单项拍卖，也包括一般的多项多赢者拍卖，我们的假设是，投标人主要关心货币收益，其次担心暴露有关其收益的信息。键入其他参与者并学习有关其他参与者类型的信息，即出价者先是贪婪然后是偏执狂。为了在博弈论的背景下明确地处理隐私问题，我们提出了一种新颖的混合效用模型，该模型同时考虑了玩家收益中的货币和隐私成分。rn我们展示了如何使用理性密码技术近似地实现任何给定的临时，单独，严格的理性均衡。通过仅在播放器之间使用点对点身份验证通道的加密协议在没有受信任的中介的情况下进行拍卖。所谓“临时临时严格个人理性”，是指，鉴于其类型和采取行动之前，每个参与者都具有严格积极的预期效用。所谓“近似实现”，是指在密码学假设下，运行协议是计算纳什均衡，其收益曲线可忽略地接近原始均衡。

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