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AN EFFICIENT INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE COMBINATORIAL MARKET MECHANISM

机译:有效的激励兼容的组合市场机制

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Service providers lease bandwidth from owners of individual links to form desired routes. Bandwidth is leased in indivisible amounts, say multiples of 100 Mbps. We study the interaction between buyers and sellers of bandwidth. Within a conventional market, we showed in [8] that a competitive equilibrium exists if agents' utilities are linear in bandwidth (and money) and they truthfully reveal them, and if the desired routes form a tree. However, strategic agents will not be truthful and the competitive equilibrium will not be realized. To ensure a good outcome among strategic agents, we propose a combinatorial double auction and examine the resulting Nash equilibria. We show that such an equilibrium exists and, more surprisingly, the resulting allocation is efficient. In reality, the players have incomplete information and are risk averse, so we consider the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under the ex post individual rationality constraint. We show that the mechanism is asymptotically Bayesian incentive-compatible and hence asymptotically efficient. Surprisingly, without the ex post individual rationality constraint, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy for the buyers is to bid more than their true value.
机译:服务提供商从各个链接的所有者那里租用带宽以形成所需的路由。带宽以不可分割的数量租用,例如100 Mbps的倍数。我们研究带宽买卖双方之间的相互作用。在传统市场中,我们在[8]中证明,如果代理商的效用在带宽(和金钱)上是线性的,并且如实地揭示它们,并且所需的路线形成一棵树,则存在竞争均衡。但是,战略代理人不会是真实的,竞争平衡也不会实现。为了确保战略代理人之间取得良好的结果,我们建议进行组合式两次拍卖,并检查由此产生的纳什均衡。我们表明存在这种平衡,更令人惊讶的是,由此产生的分配是有效的。实际上,参与者的信息不完整且不愿冒险,因此我们考虑事后个人理性约束下的贝叶斯-纳什均衡。我们证明了该机制是渐近贝叶斯激励相容的,因此渐近有效。出乎意料的是,在没有事后个人理性约束的情况下,针对购买者的贝叶斯-纳什均衡策略是出价要高于其真实价值。

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