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Auction Mechanisms for Distributed Spectrum Sharing

机译:分布式频谱共享的拍卖机制

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摘要

We study auction mechanisms for allocating power among a group of spread spectrum users. The users are assumed to share the bandwidth with a licensed user, or spectrum owner, which imposes a received power constraint (corresponding to a constraint on interference) at a particular measurement location. Both co-located and non-collocated receivers are considered. Each user receives a utility that is a function of the received Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR). We propose two auction mechanisms for power allocation in which the spectrum owner charges for SINR and received power, respectively, and compare the associated utility and revenue achieved in some simple cases. We also derive an iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm, and specify conditions for which this algorithm converges globally to the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the auction.
机译:我们研究拍卖机制,以在一组扩频用户之间分配功率。假设用户与许可用户或频谱所有者共享带宽,这在特定测量位置施加了接收功率约束(对应于干扰约束)。并置和非并置的接收器均被考虑。每个用户都会收到一个实用程序,该实用程序是接收到的信号干扰加噪声比(SINR)的函数。我们提出了两种用于功率分配的拍卖机制,其中频谱所有者分别为SINR和接收的功率收费,并比较一些简单情况下的相关效用和收益。我们还推导了迭代和分布式出价更新算法,并指定了该算法全局收敛到拍卖的纳什均衡(NE)的条件。

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