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首页> 外文会议>The Fourth International Conference on Systems Science and Systems Engineering (ICSSSE'03); Nov 25-28, 2003; Hong Kong SAR, China >SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS: PRICE-ONLY CONTRACT AND RETURNS POLICY
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SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS: PRICE-ONLY CONTRACT AND RETURNS POLICY

机译：供应链合同：仅价格合同和退货政策

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摘要

This paper studies supply chain contracts in a supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier is in the upstream supply chain and sells materials to the retailer in the downstream supply chain. There is one selling season with stochastic demand and a single opportunity for the retailer to order inventory from the supplier before the selling season begins. Although supply chains include more than two parties, this simplification allows for studying optimal contracts. In this simple setting, the supplier determines prices and retailer determines order quantities. Among various types of supply chain contracts we focus on two kinds of the most popular supply chain contracts, i.e., price-only contract and returns policy. A number of researchers have advocated returns policy to remedy this misalignment of incentives, but none realize that price-only contract sometimes may perform better than returns policy. In this paper we employ quantitative models that distinguish between price-only contract and returns policy, and determine conditions under which each will be more desirable with respect to channel coordination and individual firm performance. Specifically, we use the "newsvendor problem" model to analysis simple price-only contract and returns policy.
机译：本文研究了具有一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链中的供应链合同。供应商位于上游供应链中，并向下游供​​应链中的零售商出售材料。一个销售季节的需求是随机的，零售商在销售季节开始之前有一次机会从供应商那里订购库存。尽管供应链包括两个以上的参与者，但是这种简化允许研究最佳合同。在这种简单的设置中，供应商确定价格，而零售商确定订单数量。在各种类型的供应链合同中，我们关注两种最受欢迎​​的供应链合同，即仅价格合同和退货政策。许多研究人员提倡退货政策来纠正这种激励机制的错位，但是没有人意识到仅价格合同有时可能会比退货政策表现更好。在本文中，我们采用定量模型来区分仅价格合同和退货政策，并确定在哪种条件下，在渠道协调和个人公司绩效方面，每种条件都更为理想。具体来说，我们使用“新卖家问题”模型来分析简单的仅价格合约和退货政策。

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