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On Bidding Strategy of Divisible Object Auction

机译:可分割物品拍卖的竞价策略

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An auction is an allocative mechanism of resource used widely in practice, and that auction of divisible object is a more important but largely unexplored issue. This work describes the auction process and auction rule of the divisible object with discriminating pricing, which is described by mathematical model, and for competitors' marginal valuation is their own information, each bidder knows his own marginal valuation but is uncertain other bidders' marginal valuation, specially, supposes that the set of possible marginal valuation is the finite set and each bidder believes that every other bidder's marginal valuation is drawn independently from the same distribution and regards the set of profdes of marginal valuations as the set of states, models the situation as the Bayesian game model with incomplete information for the divisible object auction. Furthermore this paper resolves Nash equilibrium, regards marginal valuation as the type of bidders, transforms Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game for the divisible object auction into Nash equilibrium of the strategic game, and for a class of bidders' valuation function, gets bidders' bidding strategy and analyzes the bidder's behaviors reduced by the auction rule.
机译:拍卖是一种在实践中广泛使用的资源分配机制,而可分割对象的拍卖是一个更重要的问题,但在很大程度上尚待探讨。这项工作用数学模型描述了具有区分价格的可分割对象的拍卖过程和拍卖规则,并用数学模型来描述,因为竞争者的边际估价是他们自己的信息,每个投标人都知道自己的边际估价,但不确定其他投标人的边际估价,特别是,假设可能的边际估值集合是有限集合,并且每个竞标者都认为其他竞标者的边际估值是从同一分布中独立得出的,并且将边际估值的集合视为状态集,对情况进行建模作为具有不完整信息的可分割对象拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型。此外,本文解决了纳什均衡,将边际估值作为投标人的类型,将可分割对象拍卖的贝叶斯博弈的纳什均衡转化为战略博弈的纳什均衡,并针对一类投标人的估值函数,获得了投标人的报价。策略并分析竞标规则减少了竞标者的行为。

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