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SECURITY OF INFORMATION FLOW IN THE ELECTRIC POWER GRID

机译:电力网中信息流的安全性

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摘要

The confidentiality of information in a system can be breached through unrestricted information flow. The formal properties of non-deducibility and non-inference are often used to assess information flow in purely cyber environments. However, in a "cyber-physical system" (CPS), i.e., a system with significant cyber and physical components, physical actions may allow confidential information to be deduced or inferred. This paper conducts an information flow analysis of a CPS using formal models of confidentiality. The specific CPS under study is the advanced electric power grid using cooperating flexible alternating current transmission system (FACTS) devices. FACTS devices exchange confidential information and use the information to produce physical actions on the electric power grid. This paper shows that even if the information flow satisfies certain security models, confidential information may still be deduced by observation or inference of a CPS at its cyber-physical boundary. The result is important because it helps assess the confidentiality of CPSs.
机译:系统中信息的机密性可以通过不受限制的信息流来破坏。不可推论和不可推论的形式属性通常用于评估纯网络环境中的信息流。然而,在“网络物理系统”(CPS),即具有重要的网络和物理组件的系统中,物理动作可以允许推断或推断机密信息。本文使用正式的机密模型对CPS进行了信息流分析。研究中的特定CPS是使用协作的灵活交流输电系统(FACTS)设备的先进电网。 FACTS设备交换机密信息,并使用该信息在电网上产生物理作用。本文表明,即使信息流满足某些安全模型,也可以通过在CPS的网络物理边界处进行观察或推断来推断机密信息。结果很重要,因为它有助于评估CPS的机密性。

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