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Tax Under-Sheltering in Chinese Companies

机译:中国公司的避税措施

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摘要

A substantial body of literature believes that Chinese companies engage in aggressive tax avoidance, while the macro data show that the corporate sector is heavily taxed. This paper is focused on understanding the tax positions of the Chinese corporate sector, and addressing the conflict between macro data and corporate tax avoidance research. We construct a sample of all Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2017 and adopt a modified cash effective tax rate (ETR) tax avoidance measurement model. We find that on average, Chinese listed companies are under-sheltering. Specifically, most companies in China do not avoid taxes, even pay higher taxes. In further study, we interpret the generation mechanism of tax under-sheltering. We conduct a grouping OLS regression to test managerial decisions for external reporting incentives. We then examine the moderating effects of corporate ownership on managerial reporting incentive. To make our explanation more robust, we discuss the effects of loss firms. Our study enriches the research on enterprises' tax avoidance and earnings management.
机译:大量文献认为,中国公司采取积极的避税措施,而宏观数据表明,公司部门的税负很高。本文着重于了解中国公司部门的税收状况,并解决宏观数据与公司避税研究之间的冲突。我们以2012年至2017年所有中国上市公司为样本,并采用修正的现金有效税率(ETR)避税计量模型。我们发现,平均而言,中国上市公司避险。具体来说,中国的大多数公司都不会避税,甚至会缴纳更高的税。在进一步的研究中,我们解释了税收储备不足的产生机理。我们进行了分组OLS回归测试,以测试外部报告激励措施的管理决策。然后,我们研究了公司所有权对管理报告激励的调节作用。为了使我们的解释更可靠,我们讨论了亏损公司的影响。我们的研究丰富了企业避税和盈余管理方面的研究。

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