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Playing CSMA/CA Game to Deter Backoff Attacks in Ad Hoc Wireless LANs

机译:玩CSMA / CA游戏以阻止Ad Hoc无线局域网中的退避攻击

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摘要

The IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol is vulnerable to selfish backoff attacks exploiting the constituent CSMA/CA mechanism. Administrative prevention of such attacks fails in wireless ad-hoc LANs which cannot mandate stations' behavior. We take a game-theoretic approach whereby stations are allowed to maximize their payoffs (success rates). Using a fairly accurate performance model we show that a noncooperative CSMA/CA game then arises with a payoff structure characteristic of a Prisoners' Dilemma. For a repeated CSMA/CA game, a novel SPELL strategy is proposed. If the stations are rational players and wish to maximize a long-term utility, SPELL deters a single attacker by providing a disincentive to deviate from SPELL.
机译:利用组成CSMA / CA机制,IEEE 802.11 MAC协议容易受到自私的退避攻击。在无法强制执行站行为的无线ad-hoc LAN中,无法防止此类攻击的管理预防。我们采用博弈论方法,允许车站最大化其收益(成功率)。使用相当准确的绩效模型,我们证明了不合作的CSMA / CA博弈随之出现,并具有囚徒困境的收益结构特征。对于重复的CSMA / CA游戏,提出了一种新颖的SPELL策略。如果站点是理性玩家,并希望最大化长期效用,则SPELL通过提供偏离SPELL的诱因来阻止单个攻击者。

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