Policy design on green mining based on principal-agent theory

机译：基于委托-代理理论的绿色矿业政策设计

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摘要

The effectual incentive policy which can resolve the incentive incompatibility between government and mining enterprise plays a key role in carrying out the green mining. The effect on designing optimal incentive mechanism which is derived from enterprise's different risk preferences is analyzed in the condition of linear contract on the basis of the principal-agent model, some suggestions about incentive policy on the enterprise of risk averse are provided. The result shows that the share-cropping is an effective mechanism of incentive and risk sharing.

机译：能够解决政府与矿业企业之间的激励不相容问题的有效激励政策在开展绿色矿业中起着关键作用。在委托代理模型的基础上，分析了线性合同条件下企业因不同的风险偏好而产生的最优激励机制的设计效果，并对企业规避风险的激励政策提出了一些建议。结果表明，股份制是激励和风险共担的有效机制。

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来源
《International Conference on Asia-European Sustainable Urban Development; 20060404-06; Chongqing(CN)》|2006年|P.6-9|共4页
会议地点 Chongqing(CN)
作者
LONG Ru-yin; LI Ming;
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作者单位

School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221008, China;

School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221008, China;

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会议组织
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类城市与市政经济;
关键词
incentive incompatibility; green mining; principal-agent theory; incentive mechanism; risk sharing;

机译：激励不相容；绿色采矿；主代理理论；激励机制；风险分担;

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Policy design on green mining based on principal-agent theory

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