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首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Computational Science - ICCA 2003 Pt.2 Jun 2-4, 2003 Melbourne, Australia and St. Petersburg, Russia >Double Auction in Two-Level Markets
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Double Auction in Two-Level Markets

机译：两级市场的双重拍卖

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摘要

In the general discussion of double auction, three properties are mainly considered: incentive compatibility, budget balance, and economic efficiency. In this paper, we introduce another property of double auction: semi-independence, from which we are trying to reveal the essential relation between incentive compatibility and economic efficiency. Babaioff and Nisan studied supply chain of markets and corresponding protocols that solve the transaction and price issues in markets chain. In the second part of the paper, we extend their model to two-level markets, in which all markets in the supply chain are independent and controlled by different owners. Beyond this basic markets chain, there is a communication network (among all owners and another global manager) that instructs the transaction and price issues of the basic markets. Then we discuss incentive compatible problems of owners in the middle level of the markets in terms of semi-independence.
机译：在双重拍卖的一般讨论中，主要考虑三个属性：激励相容性，预算平衡和经济效率。在本文中，我们介绍了双重拍卖的另一个属性：半独立，我们试图从中揭示激励相容性与经济效率之间的本质关系。 Babaioff和Nisan研究了市场供应链以及解决市场链中交易和价格问题的相应协议。在本文的第二部分，我们将其模型扩展到两级市场，其中供应链中的所有市场都是独立的，并由不同的所有者控制。除了这个基本市场链，还有一个通讯网络（在所有所有者和另一位全球经理之间），指导基本市场的交易和价格问题。然后，我们从半独立性的角度讨论了市场中间层所有者的激励相容问题。

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