• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Information and Communications Security(ICICS 2004); 20041027-29; Malaga(ES) >Security Analysis of the Generalized Self-shrinking Generator
【24h】

Security Analysis of the Generalized Self-shrinking Generator

机译：广义自收缩发生器的安全性分析

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In this paper, we analyze the generalized self-shrinking generator newly proposed in [8]. Some properties of this generator are described and an equivalent definition is derived, after which two attacks are developed to evaluate its security. The first attack is an improved clock-guessing attack using short keystream with the filter function (vector G) known. The complexity of this attack is O(2~(0.694n)), where n is the length of the LFSR used in the generator. This attack shows that the generalized self-shrinking generator can not be more secure than the self-shrinking generator, although much more computations may be required by it. Our second attack is a fast correlation attack with the filter function (vector G) unknown. We can restore both the initial state of the LFSR with arbitrary weight feedback polynomial and the filter function (vector G) with complexity much lower than the exhaustive search. For example, for a generator with 61-stage LFSR, given a keystream segment of 2~(17.1) bits, the complexity is around 2~(56), which is much lower than 2~(122), the complexity of the exhaustive search.
机译：在本文中，我们分析了[8]中新提出的广义自收缩发生器。描述了此生成器的某些属性，并推导了等效定义，此后，开发了两次攻击以评估其安全性。第一种攻击是使用已知的过滤器功能（向量G）的短键流改进的时钟猜测攻击。这种攻击的复杂度为O（2〜（0.694n）），其中n是发生器中使用的LFSR的长度。这种攻击表明，一般的自收缩生成器不能比自收缩生成器更安全，尽管它可能需要更多的计算。我们的第二次攻击是滤波器函数（向量G）未知的快速相关攻击。我们可以使用任意权重反馈多项式恢复LFSR的初始状态，并且可以使用复杂度远低于穷举搜索的滤波函数（向量G）。例如，对于具有61级LFSR的生成器，给定2〜（17.1）位的密钥流段，其复杂度约为2〜（56），远低于穷举算法的2〜（122）。搜索。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号