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首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Present and Future Trends in Transmission and Convergence; 20021204-20021206; New Delhi; IN >TRANSMISSION PRICING: REVIEW OF EXISTING METHODOLOGY AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
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TRANSMISSION PRICING: REVIEW OF EXISTING METHODOLOGY AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

机译：变速箱价格：现有方法和替代方案的回顾

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To sum it up, the TO has incentives to optimise a sum of congestion charge and capacity charges, the variable charges at each generation node are paid to the generators as incentives for generation siting and capacity addition. SO is incentivised to reduce its own operating cost and also the cost of losses by buying adequate real and reactive support. Nodal pricing: 1. Is based on Demand and Supply and not curtailment to manage congestion. The beneficiary states would reduce their intake from the bus at which the nodal prices are high. 2. Encourages generators to locate where power is valued most. This also encourages embedded distributed generation to be located at places 3. Encourages new transmission to relieve congestion Under the scheme described above: 4. SO must serve as the provider of last resort for ancillary services 1. SO can do this through 2. Contractual Agreements 3. Market Mechanisms 4. Control of Generation Facilities 5. SO has the authority to determine the quantity and location of ancillary services The above scheme creates incentives for integration of regional grids and formation of a National Grid. Since SOs share the benefits of reduced nodal prices (because of incentives for loss reduction), and the regulations empower them to direct the TO to add transmission capacity, they would have an incentive to expedite inter-regional links to reduce nodal prices. This pricing mechanism would also provide an incentive for distributed generation (based on renewable energy sources) to come up near the load centres. The above transmission pricing mechanism provides explicit solutions to all the questions mentioned in the introduction and provides price based solutions to the following: 1. Ensures incentive based revenue requirement of TO and SO 2. All prudently incurred capital costs are recovered based on "Yardstick" Comparisons 3. Congestion is priced 4. Basic Network Access is priced 5. SO is incentivised to monitor Ancillary Services and "Power Quality".
机译：综上所述，TO有激励措施来优化拥堵收费和容量收费的总和，将每个发电节点的可变费用支付给发电机，作为激励发电选址和增加容量的激励措施。 SO被激励通过购买足够的实际和被动支持来降低自身的运营成本以及损失成本。节点定价：1.基于需求和供应，而不是减少拥堵来管理。受益国将减少节点价格高昂的公共汽车的进气量。 2.鼓励发电机定位最有价值的地方。这也鼓励将嵌入式分布式发电放置在场所3。鼓励新的传输以缓解拥塞在上述方案下：4. SO必须充当辅助服务的最后提供者1. SO可以通过2.合同协议来做到这一点3.市场机制4.发电设施的控制5. SO有权确定辅助服务的数量和位置上述方案为整合区域电网和形成国家电网创造了动力。由于SO共享降低节点价格的好处（由于减少损失的激励措施），并且法规授权它们指示TO来增加传输容量，因此它们将有动力加快区域间链接以降低节点价格。这种定价机制还将激励分布式发电（基于可再生能源）出现在负荷中心附近。上面的传输定价机制为引言中提到的所有问题提供了明确的解决方案，并为以下内容提供了基于价格的解决方案：1.确保TO和SO的基于激励的收入要求。2.基于“标准”收回所有审慎的资本成本比较3.定价拥塞4.基本网络访问定价5.激励SO监视辅助服务和“电能质量”。

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