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首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management(PSAM7-ESREL'04) v.6; 20040614-20040618; Berlin; DE >How Do the Management System's Deficiencies Affect On Safety A Case Study of Accomplishment of FMEA in a Paper Mill
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How Do the Management System's Deficiencies Affect On Safety A Case Study of Accomplishment of FMEA in a Paper Mill

机译：管理体系的缺陷如何影响安全性-以某造纸厂完成FMEA为例

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The purpose of this study was to see how the existing management system can affect on safety activities like identification of hazards in the Digester by FMEA technique. Majority of managers did not believe that hazard identification can also be affected by some deficiencies of management system. Digester is the main apparatus in the paper mill, in which wood chips after Pre-Steaming Bin enter and by aid of chemicals convert to pulp. The under study Digester was a continues one-stage KAMYER system, producing KRAFT pulp in the capacity of ～ 200 M. tons per day. After listing all components of Digester (totally 28 components) and recognizing the failure modes of each component, for determination of failure rates we had to go through existing record keeping system. Three different sources, namely maintenance & process department and spare parts store records , were used . It was found that the records had two major inadequacies. One was their degree of accuracy; eg. In the process department records it was written that the Digester was shot down in such a time of a particular day and nothing about the reasons of this act and the duration of shot down . At the same time the records of two other sources did not show any thing related to this. The second major inadequacy was the long process of ordering spare parts from the store by maintenance department. There was a form for ordering parts, which required after filling by maintenance department few signatures and this was the reason for prolongation of the ordering process. When one of those bosses who should sign the form, was not accessible (this was the case on many occasions) the form would be left in his office for as long as he was not in . Therefore the maintenance department when in need of for instance a new filter for the In - Line Drainer to replace the old failed one , because of time consuming ordering process , they filled on the form the number of filters needed not one but eg. 5 filters in order to have 4 of them in the workshop and save them for the next time when filter fails. In the records of maintenance and process departments it was reflected as the filter of In - Line Drainer changed but in the spare parts store it was recorded 5 filters were delivered. Next time when the filter failed and had to be replaced the maintenance department did not fill the form and used one of those filters saved from previous time. As a result the records of store were again different than the other two sources of records. The maintenance department was also admitted that in many occasions some of those extra ordered filters which had been kept in workshop got lost or damaged during moving them from one location to another. Therefore it was not possible to find out how many filters have failed and replaced during the past 15 years. As a result of this situation our FMEA work sheet was completed with some approximation and its validity were questioned. The highest failure rate was 69 per year for the In-Line Drainer and the lowest was 0.33 Per year for Blower and valve 128 A . From all 28 components only one ( valve 128 A) had a failure rate of 0.33 / y , which was in the range of failure rates for control valves given in the book of An introduction to machinery reliability assessment , by H.P. Bloch and F.K.Geitner, Van Nostrand Reinhold -1990 . There was not any more failure rates to be verified in any of our references. It was concluded that for at least the sake of safety the management system should get rid of all those old fashioned bureaucratic procedures.
机译：这项研究的目的是了解现有管理系统如何影响安全活动，例如通过FMEA技术识别消化池中的危害。大多数管理人员并不认为危害识别也可能受到管理系统某些缺陷的影响。蒸煮器是造纸厂的主要设备，预蒸桶中的木片进入其中，并借助化学物质转化为纸浆。正在研究中的Digester是连续的一阶段KAMYER系统，每天生产约200万吨的KRAFT纸浆。列出了Digester的所有组件（总共28个组件）并识别了每个组件的故障模式之后，为了确定故障率，我们必须通过现有的记录保存系统。使用了三种不同的来源，即维护和流程部门以及备件存储记录。发现记录有两个主要不足之处。一是他们的准确性。例如。在流程部门的记录中，记载了消化器在特定一天的某个时间被击落，而造成这种行为的原因和击落的时间却丝毫没有。同时，其他两个来源的记录也没有显示与此相关的任何信息。第二个主要不足是维护部门从商店订购备件的漫长过程。有一种订购零件的表格，在维修部门填写少量签名后，要求提供该表格，这就是延长订购过程的原因。当那些应该在表格上签名的老板之一无法访问时（在很多情况下就是这种情况），只要他不在办公室，表格就会留在他的办公室里。因此，维修部门在需要例如新的过滤器来更换在线排水器的故障时，由于订购过程耗时，他们在表格上填写了不需要的过滤器数量，例如。 5个过滤器，以便在车间拥有4个过滤器，并在过滤器出现故障时将其保存以供下次使用。在维护和工艺部门的记录中，反映了在线排水器的过滤器发生了变化，但在备件库中记录了5个过滤器已交付。下次，当过滤器发生故障并必须更换时，维护部门没有填写表格，而是使用了上次保存的过滤器之一。结果，存储记录再次不同于其他两个记录源。维修部门还承认，在许多情况下，一些原定于车间的额外订购的过滤器在将它们从一个位置移到另一个位置时会丢失或损坏。因此，不可能找出过去15年中有多少个过滤器发生故障并被更换了。由于这种情况，我们的FMEA工作表已大致完成，其有效性受到质疑。串联排污阀的最高故障率为每年69，而鼓风机和阀128 A的最低故障率为每年0.33。在全部28个组件中，只有一个组件（阀门128 A）的故障率是0.33 / y，这在H.P.的《机械可靠性评估入门》一书中给出的控制阀的故障率范围内。 Bloch和F.K. Geitner，Van Nostrand Reinhold -1990年。在我们的任何参考文献中，都没有更多的失败率可以验证。结论是，至少出于安全考虑，管理系统应该摆脱所有那些老式的官僚程序。

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