首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Tourism and the New Asia; 20060809-12; Beijing(CN) >A DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS ON PROPERTY RIGHT MANAGEMENT OF ECOTOURISM RESOURCE IN CHINA
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A DYNAMIC GAME ANALYSIS ON PROPERTY RIGHT MANAGEMENT OF ECOTOURISM RESOURCE IN CHINA

机译:中国生态旅游资源产权管理的动态博弈分析。

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Mass-oriented development modes' trends toward ignoring community interests and environmental interests in China, thus it has put ecotourism areas into a non-sustainable development state The main reason mass-oriented development mode is produced and promoted is that, under the domination of government, the property right of ecotourism resources is transferred to market from government. Such transfer first occurs between the central government and local government, and then local government marketizes it. Therefore, this also involves governmental internal interest sharing and balance issues. For the debate on the unified management mode and property right transfer management mode of ecotourism resources, this paper builds a complete information dynamic game model to discuss different utilities of the central government under different property right management modes. Results of the dynamic game analysis do not support present property right transfer policy adopted in the development of ecotourism resources by the central government. Besides, since this result just comes from an economic angle and does not include environmental loss and social welfare loss, it is estimated that the actual loss will be larger. Therefore, as a rational government, the central government will be inclined to strengthen unified management of ecotourism resources in future management mode reform. The conclusion of dynamic game also reveals that the government should, as soon as possible, work out policies that can prevent developers from developing ecotourism on a resource depletion and short-term tendency so as to protect harmonious development of ecotourisn areas from suffering serious threats.
机译:大众化发展模式忽视中国社区利益和环境利益的趋势,使生态旅游区成为一种不可持续的发展状态。大众化发展模式产生和推广的主要原因是在政府的主导下,生态旅游资源的产权从政府转移到市场。这种转移首先发生在中央政府和地方政府之间,然后地方政府将其市场化。因此,这也涉及政府内部利益共享和平衡问题。为了探讨生态旅游资源的统一管理模式和产权转移管理模式,本文建立了一个完整的信息动态博弈模型,探讨了中央政府在不同产权管理模式下的不同效用。动态博弈分析的结果不支持中央政府在生态旅游资源开发中采用的现行产权转让政策。此外,由于该结果只是从经济角度出发,不包括环境损失和社会福利损失,因此估计实际损失会更大。因此,作为一个理性政府,中央政府将倾向于在未来的管理模式改革中加强对生态旅游资源的统一管理。动态博弈的结论还表明,政府应尽快制定政策,以防止开发商在资源枯竭和短期趋势下发展生态旅游,以保护生态旅游区的和谐发展免受严重威胁。

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