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首页> 外文会议>International Workshop on Competitive Bidding and Auctions; 20041203-04; Wuhan(CN) >Guaranteed Auctions: The Auction House, the Seller, and the Buyer as Decision Makers
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Guaranteed Auctions: The Auction House, the Seller, and the Buyer as Decision Makers

机译：保证拍卖：拍卖行，卖方和买方作为决策者

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摘要

The guaranteed auction model proposed by Greenleaf, Rao, and Sinha (1993) only considers both a seller and an auction house as decision makers. However, the decision made by a buyer is not involved in their model. In this paper, we consider this decision and also further explore their model and obtain some new different results. Firstly, we give the expected payment made by the buyers to the auction house in conventional and guaranteed auction. Secondly, we obtain some new and more general relationships between the optimal reserves set by the seller in a conventional auction and by the auction house in a guaranteed auction compared with their model. Thirdly, we show that the guaranteed auction increases the size of the total revenue that both the seller and the auction house split and the expected payment for the artwork that the buyer makes to the auction house compared with the conventional auction. It follows that the guaranteed auction may be favorable to both the auction house and the seller but is not favorable to the buyer. We enhance the necessary condition for the Nash bargaining solutions previously given by both Greenleaf, Rao, and Sinha (1993) and Greenleaf, Ma, Qiu, Rao, and Sinha (2002) and conclude that the auction house has the incentive to offer a meaningful guarantee while the seller is willing to sell his or her artwork at the guaranteed auction and that the guaranteed auction benefits to both the auction house and the seller but is disadvantageous to the buyer compared with the conventional auction. We also discuss the characteristics of the Nash bargaining solutions.
机译：Greenleaf，Rao和Sinha（1993）提出的有保证的拍卖模型只将卖方和拍卖行都视为决策者。但是，购买者的决定不涉及他们的模型。在本文中，我们考虑了这一决定，并进一步探索了它们的模型并获得了一些新的不同结果。首先，我们在常规和有保证的拍卖中将买主的预期付款给拍卖行。其次，与模型相比，在传统拍卖中卖方设定的最优准备金与有保证拍卖中拍卖行设定的最优准备金之间，我们获得了一些新的更一般的关系。第三，我们证明，与常规拍卖相比，有保证的拍卖增加了卖方和拍卖行分配的总收入的大小以及买方向拍卖行做出的艺术品的预期付款。由此可见，有保证的拍卖可能对拍卖行和卖方均有利，但不利于买方。我们增强了Greenleaf，Rao和Sinha（1993）以及Greenleaf，Ma，Qiu，Rao和Sinha（2002）以前给出的纳什讨价还价解决方案的必要条件，并得出结论认为拍卖行有动力提供有意义的保证卖方愿意在有保证的拍卖中出售其艺术品，并且有保证的拍卖对拍卖行和卖方均有利，但与常规拍卖相比对买方不利。我们还将讨论纳什议价解决方案的特征。

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