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Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions

机译：完善固定系统拍卖中的廉价劳动力成本

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摘要

In set system auctions, a single buyer needs to purchase services from multiple competing providers, and the set of providers has a combinatorial structure; a popular example is provided by shortest path auctions [1,7]. In [3] it has been observed that if such an auction is conducted using first-price rules, then, counterintuitively, the buyer's payment may go down if some of the sellers are prohibited from participating in the auction. This reduction in payments has been termed "the cost of cheap labor". In this paper, we demonstrate that the buyer can attain further savings by setting lower bounds on sellers' bids. Our model is a refinement of the original model of [3]: indeed, the latter can be obtained from the former by requiring these lower bounds to take values in {0, +∞}. We provide upper and lower bounds on the reduction in the buyer's payments in our model for various set systems, such as minimum spanning tree auctions, bipartite matching auctions, single path and κ-path auctions, vertex cover auctions, and dominating set auctions. In particular, we illustrate the power of the new model by showing that for vertex cover auctions, in our model the buyer's savings can be linear, whereas in the original model of [3] no savings can be achieved.
机译：在固定系统拍卖中，单个购买者需要从多个竞争的提供商那里购买服务，并且该组提供商具有组合结构。最短路径拍卖提供了一个流行的例子[1,7]。在[3]中，已经观察到，如果使用第一价格规则进行这样的拍卖，那么与直觉相反，如果某些卖方被禁止参加拍卖，则买方的付款可能会下降。付款的减少被称为“廉价劳动力成本”。在本文中，我们证明了买方可以通过设置卖方出价的下限来获得进一步的节省。我们的模型是对[3]原始模型的改进：实际上，可以通过要求这些下限取{0，+∞}中的值来从前者获得后者。我们在模型中针对各种集合系统（例如，最小生成树拍卖，二分对匹配拍卖，单路径和κ路径拍卖，顶点封面拍卖和主导集合拍卖）为减少买方付款提供了上限和下限。特别地，我们通过显示对于顶点封面拍卖来说明新模型的强大功能，在我们的模型中，买方的储蓄可以是线性的，而在[3]的原始模型中，无法实现储蓄。

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  • 来源
    《Internet and network economics》|2009年|P.447-454|共8页
  • 会议地点 Rome(IT);Rome(IT)
  • 作者

    Ning Chen; Edith Elkind; Nick Gravin;

  • 作者单位

    Division of Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;

    Division of Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;

    Division of Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;

  • 会议组织
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 计算机网络;
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