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Design of Incentive Contracts of Independent Directors

机译：独立董事激励合同设计

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摘要

The incentive mechanism of the independent directors has not been solved yet so far. This paper analyzes the optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and independent directors under asymmetric information condition through mathematic analytic methods. The function of the incentive mechanism and the supervision mechanism should be considered synthetically in designing of the incentive contract. The first characteristic of this paper is that the supervision mechanism has been considered while designing the incentive contracts of the independent directors. The second characteristic of the paper is that the principal-agent theory in game theory has been applied in the design of incentive contracts of independent directors. The third characteristic of the paper is that the quantitative analyses are combined with qualitative analyses, and almost all the qualitative analyses and conclusions are deduced from quantitative analyses.
机译：到目前为止，独立董事的激励机制尚未解决。本文通过数学分析方法，分析了信息不对称条件下股东与独立董事之间的最优激励契约。激励合同的设计应综合考虑激励机制和监督机制的功能。本文的第一个特点是在设计独立董事激励合同时考虑了监督机制。本文的第二个特点是博弈论中的委托-代理理论已经应用于独立董事激励合同的设计中。本文的第三个特点是将定量分析与定性分析相结合，几乎所有定性分析和结论都是从定量分析中得出的。

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