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Research on Cooperation Behavior in Alliances with Exit Option

机译：退出期权的联盟合作行为研究

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A lot of research efforts which employ the models of iterated prisoner's dilemma game to analyze the cooperation behavior of alliance have been invested in the community. It has been found that the strategy of tit-for-tat is a prominent solution to achieve cooperation in the situations. However, the alliance can be terminated by firms unilaterally. It is becoming a challenge a problem to explore the behavior choice in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. This paper discovers that compared with the alliances which have no exit option, more opportunism behaviors are involved and the alliances become more volatile even using tit-for-tat when there is an exit option. Furthermore, the value and the asymmetry have a significant impact on the cooperation behavior. For instance, cooperation behavior is increased when the option value goes down, and vice versa. Similarly, the symmetry boosts observed average cooperation.
机译：在社区中进行了大量的研究工作，利用迭代囚徒困境博弈模型来分析联盟的合作行为。已经发现，针锋相对的策略是在这种情况下实现合作的重要解决方案。但是，联盟可以由公司单方面终止。在具有退出选项的迭代囚徒困境游戏中探索行为选择已成为一个挑战。本文发现，与没有退出选择权的联盟相比，涉及更多的机会主义行为，并且即使存在退出选择权时，即使采用针锋相对的方式，联盟也变得更加不稳定。此外，值和不对称性对合作行为也有重要影响。例如，当期权价值下降时，合作行为会增加，反之亦然。同样，对称性提高了观察到的平均配合。

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