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首页> 外文会议>Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics >AN INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR CHOOSING THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS PROVIDERS
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AN INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR CHOOSING THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS PROVIDERS

机译：选择第三方物流提供者的奖励方案

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摘要

To choose third party logistics providers, lots of methods are developed, most of them focus on cost, time limit or quality uniquely, and none can take them all into consideration.This paper develops a game-theoretic model that studies the contract design problem.The model, in which the quality and cost of the providers are private information, involves a third party logistics buyer and many providers.By employing different coefficient to cost, time limit, quality and other related index, applying the Revelation Principle, the paper forwards the optimal contract Furthermore, the contract includes the penalty for failure to comply with preset standards which is independent of the performance level. Under the preset game-theoretic model, the provider puts forward the scenario according to its own situations and decides the price rationally.At last, the paper proves that the proposed optimal contract is independent of the ex-ante beliefs which the service buyer has.
机译：为了选择第三方物流供应商，人们开发了很多方法，其中大多数方法都是着眼于成本，时间限制或质量，而没有一种方法可以将它们全部考虑在内。本文开发了一种用于研究合同设计问题的博弈模型。供应商的质量和成本是私人信息的模型，涉及到第三方物流购买者和许多供应商。最佳合同此外，合同还包括不遵守与绩效水平无关的预设标准的罚款。在预设的博弈论模型下，提供者根据自身情况提出了方案，并合理地决定了价格。

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