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EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS

机译：实施EURATOM安全保障的演变

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The European Commission has now reached broad agreement with the European Council and other major stakeholders on the implementation of EURATOM Treaty safeguards and in doing so, concluded a major review of its work which began in 2001. The resultant new safeguards approach provides for a system of control and verification adapted to today’s nuclear environment, providing as it does a flexible, risk based approach. The linchpin of the European Commission's work remains the provision of the necessary assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended use as declared by the users. The purpose of such an assurance is self-evident as is its importance, given the likely resurgence of nuclear power in the European Union (EU). That said, this overarching objective is linked to crosscutting issues affecting several other European Commission directorates, international organisations and third parties: 1. A rigorous and effective assurance of use not only provides for confirmation but also acts as a significant deterrent to any misuse. Given the concerns over a range of illegal uses from simple neglect to radiological terrorism, this is a key issue. 2. It is clear that while all risks must be considered in any rigorous assessment of nonproliferation, those posed by EU Member States are not at the forefront of public attention. The same cannot necessarily be said for all third states, some of whom may be tempted to look to the EU as an illicit source of the fissile material. [Such material is acknowledged as the most difficult component to obtain for any would-be proliferator] A control on use under EURATOM Treaty safeguards therefore also provides for assurance on an international dimension and provides a solid basis for the verifications of the IAEA - the responsible body for world-wide safeguards. 3. Any misuse of nuclear material has the potential for a serious negative impact on the public perception of nuclear power and, subsequent consequences on security of supply. This paper details the European Commission's new approach which provides for a combination of audit/physical verifications resulting in an overall risk-based analysis of the EU fuel cycle, allowing resources to be focussed where most needed.
机译：欧盟委员会现已就执行《 EURATOM条约》保障措施与欧洲理事会及其他主要利益相关者达成广泛协议，并在此过程中完成了对自2001年开始的工作的主要审查。由此产生的新保障措施方法为欧盟建立了一套制度。适应当今核环境的控制和验证，因为它采取了一种灵活的，基于风险的方法。 欧盟委员会工作的关键仍然是提供必要的保证，即核材料不会从用户声明的用途中挪用。鉴于欧洲联盟（EU）可能重新出现核电，这种保证的目的及其重要性是不言而喻的。也就是说，这一总体目标与影响其他几个欧洲委员会理事会，国际组织和第三方的跨领域问题有关： 1.严格有效的使用保证不仅可以确认，而且还可以防止任何滥用。鉴于人们对从非法忽视到放射性恐怖主义等一系列非法使用的担忧，这是一个关键问题。 2.显然，尽管在对不扩散进行任何严格评估时都必须考虑所有风险，但欧盟成员国所构成的那些风险并没有引起公众的关注。不一定对所有第三州都说相同的话，其中一些州可能会倾向于将欧盟视为裂变材料的非法来源。 [这种材料被公认为是任何可能成为扩散者的最难获得的组成部分]因此，对《 EURATOM条约》保障措施下使用的控制也为国际上的保证提供了保证，并为国际原子能机构的核查提供了坚实的基础。全球保障机构。 3.任何滥用核材料的行为都可能对公众对核电的看法产生严重的负面影响，并进而对供应安全造成后果。 本文详细介绍了欧盟委员会的新方法，该方法将审计/物理验证相结合，从而对欧盟燃料循环进行了基于风险的整体分析，从而使资源可以集中在最需要的地方。

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