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首页> 外文会议>The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会）论文集 >Corporate Control Arrangement, Tunneling and the Long-term Post-acquisition Performance of Acquirers: Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in China
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Corporate Control Arrangement, Tunneling and the Long-term Post-acquisition Performance of Acquirers: Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in China

机译：公司控制安排，隧道化和收购方的长期收购后绩效：来自中国上市公司的经验证据

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摘要

We study the effect of corporate control arrangement on the long-term post-acquisition performance of acquirers from the tunneling perspective in this paper. Our empirical evidence reveals three points. First, the acquirer' performance is worse when ultimate controller' cash flow right is low. Second, the longer the control chain between the ultimate controller and listed firm is, the worse the performance of the acquirer is. Third, when other big shareholders of listed firm possess strong equity restriction capacities, the performance is relatively better. The results of this paper may contribute to supervise the M&A activities from the corporate control arrangement perspective in China.
机译：本文从隧穿的角度研究了公司控制安排对收购方长期收购后绩效的影响。我们的经验证据揭示了三点。首先，当最终控制人的现金流量权较低时，收购方的表现会更差。其次，最终控制人与上市公司之间的控制链越长，收购方的业绩越差。第三，上市公司其他大股东具有较强的股权约束能力时，业绩相对较好。本文的结果可能有助于从公司控制安排的角度对中国的并购活动进行监督。

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