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首页> 外文会议>IEEE international conference on advanced management science;IEEE ICAMS 2010 >Supply Chain Coordination by Revenue Sharing and Effort Contracts
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Supply Chain Coordination by Revenue Sharing and Effort Contracts

机译：通过收益共享和努力合同进行供应链协调

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Under a revenue-sharing contract, the paper probes the main factors that affect the performance of supply chain, analyzes how to maintain the stability of the supply chain system. Considering a supply chain with a manufacturer and a distributor, based on game model, revenue sharing, contribute coefficient, innovation cost are discussed. The results indicate that the optimum effort varies directly with sharing coefficient and contribution coefficient, while varies inversely with the cost of innovate activity. The results also suggest the optimum sharing coefficient is relevant to contribute coefficient, innovation cost, but not significant to effort level. Comparing with Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Equilibrium, the article demonstrates that total revenue of supply chain in cooperative action strategy is less than non-cooperative. Besides, the effort level is also improved in cooperation strategy. For each member in supply chain, the member should determine their efforts, contribution and profit sharing proportion, and meanwhile they need to improve their core competitiveness. In addition, the members always asked for the purpose of collective overall profit
机译：在收益共享合同下，本文探讨了影响供应链绩效的主要因素，分析了如何维持供应链系统的稳定性。考虑具有制造商和分销商的供应链，基于博弈模型，讨论了收益共享，贡献系数，创新成本。结果表明，最佳努力与共享系数和贡献系数成正比，而与创新活动的成本成反比。结果还表明，最佳共享系数与贡献系数，创新成本有关，而与工作水平无关。与纳什均衡和帕累托均衡相比，本文证明了合作行动策略中供应链的总收益小于非合作收益。此外，在合作策略上的努力水平也得到了提高。对于供应链中的每个成员，成员应确定自己的努力，贡献和利润分配比例，同时还需要提高自己的核心竞争力。另外，成员们总是要求以集体整体利润为目的

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