The Optimal Incentive Contract for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent

机译：基于委托-代理的闭环供应链最优激励契约

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It is significant to coordinate interest distribution and improve the overall efficiency of closed-loop supply chain system. In this paper, we explore a two-level CLSCS comprised of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering substitutability and uncertainty in closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry condition, we propose a multi-task principal-agent model to maximize expected income of manufacturer and certainty equivalence income of retailer. Analysis results show the manufacturer will design incentive coefficients and the retailer will adjust effort levels according to risk-averse degree, external uncertainty and correlation coefficient of the marginal effort cost.

机译：协调利益分配和提高闭环供应链系统的整体效率具有重要意义。在本文中，我们探索了由制造商和零售商组成的两级CLSCS。考虑信息不对称条件下闭环供应链的可替代性和不确定性，我们提出了一种多任务委托-代理模型，以最大化制造商的预期收入和零售商的确定性当量收入。分析结果表明，制造商将设计激励系数，而零售商将根据风险规避程度，外部不确定性和边际工作成本的相关系数来调整工作水平。

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《IEEE international conference on advanced management science;IEEE ICAMS 2010》|2010年|p.16-19|共4页
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Wenqian LU;
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正文语种
中图分类管理学;管理学;
关键词
closed-loop supply chain; multi-task principalagent; incentive contract; overall efficiency;

机译：闭环供应链;多任务委托代理;激励契约;总体效率;

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2. Incentive strategies for an optimal recovery program in a closed-loop supply chain [J] . De Giovanni Pietro, Reddy Puduru V., Zaccour Georges European Journal of Operational Research . 2016,第2期

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3. A joint maximization incentive in closed-loop supply chains with competing retailers: The case of spent-battery recycling [J] . De Giovanni Pietro European Journal of Operational Research . 2018,第1期

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4. The Optimal Incentive Contract for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based onPrincipal-Agent [C] . Wenqian LU IEEE International Conference on Advanced Management Science . 2010

机译：基于螺栓的闭环供应链的最佳激励合同
5. A study of closed-loop supply chain models with governmental incentives and fees. [D] . Valenzuela, Karla B. 2009

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6. Fair but Risky? Recycle Pricing Strategies in Closed-Loop Supply Chains [O] . Jianhong He, Lei Zhang, Xiao Fu, 2018

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7. Analysis of supply chain principal-agent incentive contract [O] . Guohong Shi, Zhiwang Qian, Danqin Zhang 2007

机译：供应链委托 - 代理激励合同分析

The Optimal Incentive Contract for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent

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