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首页> 外文会议>CSO 2010;International joint conference on computational sciences and optimization >The Revenue Share Allocation Decision for the Retailer under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing and Asymmetry of Manufacturing Cost
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The Revenue Share Allocation Decision for the Retailer under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing and Asymmetry of Manufacturing Cost

机译：带有收益共享和制造成本不对称的寄售合同下零售商的收益分成分配决策

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摘要

In a two-echelon supply chain under consignment contract with revenue sharing, firstly, the manufacturer reports his manufacturing cost to the retailer; secondly, for each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier according to the manufacturer's manufacturing cost reported; thirdly, the supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product, and retains ownership of the goods. To maximize her own profit, the manufacturer will misreport his manufacturing cost for asymmetric information. In this paper, we show that there is a unique solution in equilibrium. Those elegant analytical results allowes us to know the revenue share allocation decision is determined by two system paratneters-the retailer's cost share and the demand price-elasticity index. In our research, we know how the retailer's revenue share changes with system parameters.
机译：在具有收益共享的委托合同的两级供应链中，首先，制造商将其制造成本报告给零售商;其次，制造商向零售商报告其制造成本。其次，对于所售出的每件商品，零售商从售价中扣除一定百分比，并将余额根据制造商报告的制造成本汇给供应商。第三，供应商决定其产品的零售价和交货数量，并保留商品所有权。为了最大程度地提高自己的利润，制造商会针对不对称信息错误地报告其制造成本。在本文中，我们证明了在平衡中存在唯一的解。那些精美的分析结果使我们知道收入份额分配决策是由两个系统参数决定的，即零售商的成本份额和需求价格弹性指数。在我们的研究中，我们知道零售商的收入份额如何随系统参数而变化。

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