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Component-Oriented Monitoring of Binaries for Security

机译:面向组件的二进制文件安全性监视

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摘要

Security monitoring systems operate typically at the process level. Various authors have indicated that monitoring at a finer level of granularity than the process is highly desirable. In this paper, we introduce COMB, a framework for imposing policies to confine the behavior of applications. Unlike previous approaches, our technique is applied per component (functions, libraries, and/or plugins) while requiring only the availability of the binary executable form of the program. To demonstrate the feasibility of COMB, we report a case study on a real-world, representative program, the Firefox web browser. Two characteristics of Firefox permit possibly untrusted code to be executed. First, it provides an extensible architecture to allow third-party developers to extend its functionality, and second it makes use of more than 150 external libraries. Using a simple system-call monitoring policy applied to Firefox plugins, we show that COMB can provide protection with reasonable overhead.
机译:安全监视系统通常在过程级别运行。各种各样的作者已经指出,非常需要在比该过程更精细的粒度级别上进行监视。在本文中,我们介绍了COMB,COMB是用于实施限制应用程序行为的策略的框架。与以前的方法不同,我们的技术适用于每个组件(功能,库和/或插件),而只需要程序的二进制可执行形式的可用性。为了演示COMB的可行性,我们报告了一个真实的,具有代表性的程序Firefox Web浏览器的案例研究。 Firefox的两个特征允许执行可能不受信任的代码。首先,它提供了可扩展的体系结构,以允许第三方开发人员扩展其功能,其次,它使用了150多个外部库。通过将简单的系统调用监视策略应用于Firefox插件,我们证明COMB可以以合理的开销提供保护。

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