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Rearch on incentive-constraint mechanism of Chinese private enterprises manager

机译:中国民营企业经营者激励约束机制研究

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摘要

Due to inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information, serious principal-agent problems often occur between private business owners and their professional managers. The first problem of the principal-agent problem in private businesses is monitoring, i.e., the problem of asymmetric information, while the second probelem is the incentive-constraint problem based on the monitoring. Only effective monitoring can well evaluate the contribution of professional managers, which can more effectively motivate professional managers.
机译:由于目标不一致和信息不对称,私人企业主与其职业经理人之间经常会发生严重的委托代理问题。私营企业中委托代理问题的第一个问题是监控,即信息不对称问题,而第二个问题是基于监控的激励约束问题。只有有效的监督才能很好地评估职业经理人的贡献,从而可以更有效地激励职业经理人。

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