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首页> 外文会议>2011 Fourth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering >Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supervision Strategy for Behavior of Public Institution Leaked Customers Information
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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supervision Strategy for Behavior of Public Institution Leaked Customers Information

机译：事业单位泄漏客户信息行为监督策略的演化博弈分析

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So many public institutions have leaked customers' information in resent years. Those brought losses to customers. The supervision strategy for behavior of public institution leaked customers' information is a complicated system project. Evolution game theory is adopted to build the model of supervision. This paper gives the mixed regulatory strategy. What' s more, the Nash equilibrium solution and its economic significance are also showed in it. Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to supervise those actions. Governing that behavior of public institutions needs all persons make great efforts together. It is not only increasing the amount publish to the monitoring body and establishing a sound law protection system, but also strengthening the customers' self-protection consciousness of personal information.
机译：许多年来，许多公共机构都在泄露客户的信息。这些给客户带来了损失。事业单位泄露客户信息行为的监督策略是一项复杂的系统工程。采用演化博弈论建立监督模型。本文提出了混合监管策略。此外，还显示了纳什均衡解及其经济意义。最后，本文提出了对这些行为进行监督的政策建议。治理公共机构的行为需要所有人共同努力。这不仅增加了向监管机构发布的数量，建立了完善的法律保护体系，而且还增强了客户对个人信息的自我保护意识。

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