• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>International conference on public administration >Analysis of Local Government Game Behaviors in Regional Industrial Transfer in China
【24h】

Analysis of Local Government Game Behaviors in Regional Industrial Transfer in China

机译：中国区域产业转移中的地方政府博弈行为分析

获取原文
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

With the national proposal of three key strategies on regional economic development, inter-regional industry transfer has become the important means for the balance of regional economic development.So under the circumstance of given resource constraints local governments are inevitably involved in competitive games in pursuit of self-interest maximization. The Paper will research and analyze the relevant problems about behavior of games caused by the pursuit of interest during regional industry transfer.Because of the underdevelopment of economic system, market competition, administrative segmentation, In China the inter-regional industry transfer has its own characteristics. So supported by theories of regional industrial transfer, this paper will analyze the motivation of interests-pursuit of each local governments and construct a game analysis framework, at last suggest some policies that local governments should offer under the circumstance of playing games.
机译：随着国家关于区域经济发展三大战略战略的提出，区域间产业转移已成为实现区域经济发展平衡的重要手段，因此在资源有限的情况下，地方政府必然会参与竞争性博弈以追求经济增长。自我利益最大化。本文将研究和分析区域产业转移过程中由于利益追求引起的博弈行为的相关问题。由于经济体制的不发达，市场竞争，行政区划的影响，中国区域间产业转移具有自己的特点。 。因此，在区域产业转移理论的支持下，本文将分析各个地方政府的利益追求动机，并构建一个博弈分析框架，最后提出一些地方政府在玩游戏的情况下应提供的政策。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号