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首页> 外文会议>FRCFM;International conference on financial risk and corporate finance management >Performance Stock Option Is A Terrible Incentive Tool?
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Performance Stock Option Is A Terrible Incentive Tool?

机译：绩效股票期权是一种糟糕的激励工具吗？

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摘要

Since 2001, the effect of performance stock option for manager incentive is in a dilemma. Some scholars argue that stock option incentive should be abandoned, but some scholars argue that stock option incentive should be continuously applied. This paper systematically studies the valuation of performance stock option and incentive contracts in order to conclude the three results: (1) to improve the model of vesting numbers and exercise price for their stock option, so that to control managers manipulate the profit and stock price to get the capital gain of their stock share; (2) like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of USA, this paper sets a penalizing mechanism for manager incentive contract in order to increase the incentive efficiency of performance stock option, (3) this paper shows that above model and theory can provide an answer that the improved model of performance stock option is not a terrible incentive tool but is the most useful incentive tool in practice.
机译：自2001年以来，绩效股票期权对经理人激励的作用一直处于两难境地。一些学者认为应该放弃股票期权激励，但是有些学者认为应该继续采用股票期权激励。本文系统地研究了绩效股票期权和激励合同的估值，得出以下三个结论：（1）完善股票期权的归属数和行使价模型，以控制管理者操纵利润和股票价格。获得其股份的资本收益; （2）与美国的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（Sarbanes-Oxley Act）一样，本文设定了经理人激励合同的惩罚机制，以提高绩效股票期权的激励效率;（3）本文表明，上述模型和理论可以提供以下答案：改进的绩效股票期权模型并不是一个可怕的激励工具，而是实践中最有用的激励工具。

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