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Walrasian equilibrium power allocation in protected and shared bands

机译:保护和共享频带中的Walrasian平衡功率分配

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We consider two transmitter-receiver pairs (links) operating on protected and shared frequency bands. Each link has a frequency band to use exclusively without any interference from the other link. A frequency band is shared between the two links. We study the power allocation problem of the two transmitters in the available bands using models from microeconomic theory. We model the setting as a competitive market in which the links are the consumers and transmission power are goods which can be bought by the consumers at specific prices. We assume there exists an authority, the arbitrator, which determines the prices of the goods and forwards them to the consumers. The Walrasian equilibrium in this model is Pareto optimal and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We show that the Walrasian equilibrium always exists in our setting. We provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium and also for the global stability of the price adjustment process to reach the equilibrium.
机译:我们考虑在受保护和共享频带上工作的两个收发器对(链路)。每条链路都有一个专用频带,而不会受到另一条链路的干扰。两条链路之间共享一个频带。我们使用微观经济学模型研究了可用频段内两个发射机的功率分配问题。我们将这种环境建模为竞争市场,在这种市场中,链接是消费者,而传输力是可以由消费者以特定价格购买的商品。我们假设存在一个机构,即仲裁员,该机构确定商品的价格并将其转发给消费者。该模型中的Walrasian均衡是帕累托最优的,并且对应于将需求等同于商品供应的价格。我们证明了瓦尔拉斯均衡始终存在于我们的环境中。我们为Walrasian均衡的唯一性以及为达到均衡而进行的价格调整过程的全球稳定性提供了充分的条件。

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