Who Wins on Wage Decision:An Empirical Study of the Effects of Bargaining Power on Wages in China

机译：谁在工资决定上获胜：议价能力对中国工资影响的实证研究

获取原文

页面导航

摘要
著录项
相似文献
相关主题

摘要

This paper employs the analysis framework and the two-tier stochastic frontier model proposed by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2007) as well as the dataset of China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to identify and estimate the impact of bargaining power on wage rate in China.The preliminary econometric analysis shows that in China the firms are much more powerful than the workers in bargaining wage contracts.Consequently,the wage rate is much lower than the benchmark level determined by the human capital and productivity level.While this difference between the actual wage rates and the benchmark levels can also be observed in other countries including the United States,it is of heightened significance in China.The average difference is as high as 16％ in China,while in the US it is only about 3％ according to Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2007,2009).Low-wage earner has less bargaining power and is more vulnerable to market shocks.Our study will shed light on a heated topic which is the share of labor's compensation to GDP decreased from 56％ in 1990 to 48％ in 2009.Our conclusion is that in order for China to harmonize the labor relations,the bargaining structure of the labor market needs to be well regulated through institutional changes to increase the share of labor's compensation to GDP and low-wage earner's welfare.

机译：本文利用Kumbhakar和Parmeter（2007）提出的分析框架和两层随机前沿模型以及中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）的数据集来识别和估算议价能力对中国工资率的影响初步的计量经济学分析表明，在谈判工资合同方面，中国的公司比工人强大得多。因此，工资率远低于人力资本和生产率水平所确定的基准水平。在包括美国在内的其他国家，也可以观察到工资率和基准水平，这在中国具有重要意义。根据美国的统计，中国的平均差异高达16％，而在美国，平均差异仅为3％。 Kumbhakar和Parmeter（2007,2009）。低收入者的议价能力较低，更容易受到市场冲击。博尔对国内生产总值的补偿从1990年的56％下降到2009年的48％。我们的结论是，为了使中国的劳资关系和谐，需要通过制度变迁来很好地调节劳动力市场的讨价还价结构，以增加劳动力的议价权。劳动对GDP的补偿和低收入者的福利。

著录项

来源
《International Institute of Statistics Management Engineering Symposium》|2012年|551-558|共8页
会议地点
作者
SONG Zhan; MU Junlin;
展开▼
作者单位

展开▼
会议组织
原文格式 PDF
正文语种
中图分类管理学;
关键词
Bargaining Power; Wage Decision; Two-tier Stochastic Frontier Model;

机译：议价能力;工资决策;两层随机边界模型;

相似文献

外文文献
中文文献
专利

1. How does China's air pollution influence its labor wage distortions? Theoretical and empirical analysis from the perspective of spatial spillover effects [J] . Jun Yang, Lan Xu Science of the total environment . 2020,第Nova25期

机译：中国的空气污染如何影响其劳动力扭曲？空间溢出效应的视角下的理论和实证分析
2. The Impact of International Trade on Wage Gaps in Different Industries: An Empirical Study Based on China’s Manufacturing Panel Data [J] . Lingyan Ji Open Journal of Social Sciences . 2019,第3期

机译：国际贸易对不同行业工资差距的影响：基于中国制造业面板数据的实证研究
3. Is China＇s Economic Growth Profit- led or Wage-led.——A Theoretical Inquiry and Empirical Study on the Impact of Labor Share on Growth [J] . Liu Dun, Shi Zulin, Lin Daidai 中国经济学人：英文版 . 2015,第003期

机译：中国的经济增长是以利润为主导还是以工资为主导？-关于劳动分担对增长影响的理论研究与实证研究
4. Who Wins on Wage Decision:An Empirical Study of the Effects of Bargaining Power on Wages in China [C] . SONG Zhan, MU Junlin International Institute of Statistics Management Engineering Symposium . 2012

机译：谁赢得了工资决定：议价权力对中国工资影响的实证研究
5. The impact of rising trade on wage inequality: An empirical study on U.S.-China trade from 2000-2010. [D] . Chen, Jie. 2013

机译：贸易增长对工资不平等的影响：2000年至2010年中美贸易的实证研究。
6. Wage Penalties or Wage Premiums? A Socioeconomic Analysis of Gender Disparity in Obesity in Urban China [O] . Jiangli Dou, Limin Du, Ken Wang, 2020

机译：工资罚款或工资保费？城市肥胖中性别差异的社会经济分析
7. We analyze, in this paper, a DSGE New Keynesian model with indi- visible labor where firms may belong to two different final goods producing sectors one where wages and employment are determined in competitive labor markets and the orther where wages and employment are the result of a contractual process between unions and firms. Bargaining between firms and monopoly unions implies real wage rigidity in the model and, in turn, an endogenous trade-off between output stabilization and infla- tion stabilization. We show that the negative effect of a productivity shock on inflation and the positive effect of a cost-push shock is crucially determined by the proportion of firms that belong to the competitive sec- tor. The larger is this number, the smaller are these effects. We derive a welfare based objective function as a second order Taylor approxima- tion of the expected utility of the economy's representative agent and we analyze optimal monetary policy. We show that the larger is the num- ber of firms that belong to the competitive sector, the smaller should be the response of the nominal interest rate to exogenous productivity and cost-push shocks. If we consider, however, an instrument rule where the interest rate must react to inflationary expectations, the rule is not af- fected by the structure of the labor market. The results of the model are consistent with a well known empirical regularity in macroeconomics, i.e. that employment volatility is larger than real wage volatility. [O] . Lorenza Rossi, Fabrizio Mattesini 100

机译：在本文中，我们分析了DsGE新凯恩斯主义模型，该模型具有明显的劳动力，其中企业可能属于两个不同的最终产品生产部门，其中工资和就业是在竞争性劳动力市场中确定的，而工资和就业是由工资和就业导致的。工会和公司之间的合同过程。企业和垄断联盟之间的讨价还价意味着模型中的实际工资刚性，反过来，产出稳定和通货膨胀稳定之间的内生权衡。我们表明，生产率冲击对通货膨胀的负面影响以及成本推动冲击的积极影响，主要取决于属于竞争部门的企业比例。这个数字越大，这些效果越小。我们得出一个基于福利的目标函数作为经济代理人的预期效用的二阶泰勒近似，我们分析最优货币政策。我们表明，属于竞争性行业的企业数量越大，名义利率对外生生产率和成本推动冲击的反应就越小。但是，如果我们考虑利率必须对通胀预期作出反应的工具规则，则该规则不受劳动力市场结构的影响。该模型的结果与宏观经济学中众所周知的经验规律一致，即就业波动率大于实际工资波动率。

Who Wins on Wage Decision:An Empirical Study of the Effects of Bargaining Power on Wages in China

摘要

著录项

相似文献

相关主题

期刊订阅