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Game Analysis on Credit Deficiency of NGO from the View of Principal-agent Theory

机译：委托代理理论视角下的非政府组织信用缺失博弈分析

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摘要

The structural features of non-governmental organization can be essentially described with the trust-agent chain classified into two types. The public being the principal and the government the agent as the first type, while the government being the principal and the non-governmental organization the agent as the second type. Game theory is used in this article to analysis their respective cost and profit of behaviors in this two relations, exploring deep factors on credit deficiency of non-governmental organization. And we can come to the conclusion that non-governmental organizations'credit is affected by factors of government supervisory cost, the extra revenue of non-governmental organizations being dishonest and punishment effect on unfaithful behavior in their organizational process. At last we explore what measures should be taken to solve the problem on credit deficiency.
机译：可以将信任代理链分为两种类型来描述非政府组织的结构特征。第一类是公众，而政府是主体，第二类是政府。本文运用博弈论分析了这两种关系中它们各自的行为成本和收益，探索了非政府组织信用缺失的深层因素。我们可以得出这样的结论：非政府组织的信用受到政府监督成本，非政府组织的额外收入不诚实以及对组织过程中不忠行为的惩​​罚作用的影响。最后探讨了应采取哪些措施解决信贷不足问题。

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