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Channel bargaining with loss-averse retailer under general stochastic demand

机译：通过一般随机需求渠道讨价还价损失 - 厌购者

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摘要

We consider a channel bargaining problem in a two-echelon supply chain in this paper. Employing a loss-aversion utility function, we model the decision-making behavior of a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer which is very common in practice. By investigating the equilibrium optimal order quantity and the equilibrium optimal wholesale price, we find that there exit equilibria for the equal bargaining power problem as well as for the unequal bargaining power problem. By analyzing the impacts on the equilibria and profit allocations and assuming the stochastic demand follows a uniform distribution with support over [0, b], we find that equilibrium wholesale price and the manufacturer's share of supply chain are not changing with the uniform demand distribution upper bound. However, equilibrium order quantity is strictly increasing with the uniform demand distribution upper bound.
机译：我们在本文中考虑了双梯队供应链中的渠道讨价还价问题。 采用亏损厌购实用程序功能，我们模拟了丢失 - 厌恶零售商的决策行为和风险中立制造商在实践中非常常见。 通过调查均衡最佳订单数量和均衡最优批发价格，我们发现对平衡的票价电力问题出口，以及不平等的讨价还价问题。 通过分析对均衡和利润分配的影响，并假设随机需求跟随均匀分布，并在[0，b]的支持下，我们发现均衡批发价格和制造商的供应链份额不断变化，均匀需求分布 边界。 然而，均匀需求分布上限的平衡阶数量严格增加。

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