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Secure second price auctions with a rational auctioneer

机译：与理性的拍卖师一起确保第二价格拍卖

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摘要

We present novel security requirements for second price auctions and a simple, efficient and practical protocol that provably maintains these requirements. Novel requirements are needed because commonly used requirements, such as the indistinguishability-based secrecy requirement of encryption schemes presented by (Goldwasser and Micali, 1982), do not fit properly in the second price auctions context. Additionally, the presented protocol uses a trustworthy supervisor that checks if the auctioneer deviated from the protocol and fines him accordingly. By making sure the expected utility of the auctioneer when deviating from the protocol is lower than his expected utility when abiding by the protocol we ascertain that a rational auctioneer will abide by the protocol. This allows the supervisor to optimize by performing (computationally-intensive) inspections of the auctioneer with only low probability.
机译：我们提出了用于第二次价格拍卖的新颖安全性要求，以及可证明可维护这些要求的简单，有效和实用的协议。之所以需要新的要求，是因为常用的要求（例如，由（Goldwasser and Micali，1982）提出的基于加密算法的基于不可区分性的保密要求）不适合第二次价格拍卖的情况。另外，提出的协议使用了一个可信赖的监督者，该监督者检查拍卖人是否偏离协议并相应地对其进行罚款。通过确保拍卖人在偏离协议时的预期效用低于拍卖人在遵守协议时的预期效用，我们确定了理性的拍卖人将遵守协议。这允许监督者通过以低概率执行（计算密集型）对拍卖师的检查来进行优化。

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