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An Experimental Evaluation of Bidders' Behavior in Ad Auctions

机译：广告竞标中投标人行为的实验评估

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We performed controlled experiments of human participants in a continuous sequence of ad auctions, similar to those used by Internet companies. The goal of the research was to understand users' strategies in making bids. We studied the behavior under two auction types: (1) the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction and (2) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VGG) payment rule, and manipulated also the participants' knowledge conditions: (1) explicitly given valuations and (2) payoff information from which valuations could be deduced. We found several interesting behaviors, among them are: 1. No convergence to equilibrium was detected; moreover the frequency with which participants modified their bids increased with time. 2. We can detect explicit "better-response" behavior rather than just mixed bidding. 3. While bidders in GSP auctions do strategically shade their bids, they tend to bid higher than theoretically predicted by the standard VCG-like equilibrium of GSP. 4. Bidders who are not explicitly given their valuations but can only deduce them from their gains behave a little less "precisely" than those with such explicit knowledge, but mostly during an initial learning phase. 5. VCG and GSP yield approximately the same (high) social welfare, but GSP tends to give higher revenue.
机译：我们以连续的广告拍卖顺序对人类参与者进行了受控实验，类似于互联网公司所使用的实验。该研究的目的是了解用户的出价策略。我们研究了两种拍卖类型下的行为：（1）广义第二价格（GSP）拍卖和（2）Vickrey-Clarke-Groves（VGG）付款规则，并且还操纵了参与者的知识条件：（1）明确给定的估值和（2）可从中推导出估值的收益信息。我们发现了一些有趣的行为，其中包括：1.未检测到收敛到平衡;此外，参与者修改出价的频率会随着时间的推移而增加。 2.我们可以检测到明显的“更好的响应”行为，而不仅仅是混合招标。 3.虽然GSP拍卖中的竞标者确实在策略上掩盖了他们的出价，但他们的出价往往高于GSP的类似VCG的标准均衡理论所预测的价格。 4.没有明确给出估值但只能从中获利的投标人的行为比那些具有明确知识的投标人的“精确”要少一些，但主要是在最初的学习阶段。 5. VCG和GSP产生大致相同（高）的社会福利，但是GSP往往会带来更高的收入。

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