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Forward electricity markets with uncertain supply: Cost sharing and efficiency loss

机译：供电不确定的远期电力市场：成本分担和效率损失

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Renewable energy continues to increase its share of total US electricity production at a dramatic rate. Power derived from such resources is inherently variable and naturally incurs a balancing cost to the power system. A basic question we aim to address in this paper is, given a collection of variable energy producers, how to disentangle the individual sources of cost causation from the aggregate system cost and allocate it back to those responsible parties, so as to induce a near efficient outcome in the forward market for energy. In particular, we propose an ex post cost sharing mechanism, satisfying certain fairness axioms, to allocate to each player a share of the total system cost in proportion to her relative contribution to the aggregate system imbalance. We establish the existence and certain properties of Nash equilibria of the forward contract game under proportional cost sharing and provide an explicit characterization for the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as the number of participants in the market grows large. We also characterize a family of `worst case' prior distributions on the supply profile at which the asymptotic PoA is maximized.
机译：可再生能源继续以惊人的速度增加其在美国总发电量中的份额。从这些资源获得的电力具有内在的可变性，自然会给电力系统带来平衡的成本。在本文中，我们要解决的一个基本问题是，在收集了可变能源生产者的情况下，如何从系统总成本中区分出成本因果的各个来源，然后将其分配回负责的各方，从而产生近乎有效的收益。能源远期市场的结果。特别是，我们提出一种满足某些公平公理的事后成本分摊机制，根据每个参与者对系统总体失衡的相对贡献，将总系统成本的份额分配给每个参与者。我们建立了按比例成本分担的远期合约博弈的纳什均衡的存在和某些性质，并随着市场参与者数量的增加，对无政府定价（PoA）进行了明确的描述。我们还在供给曲线上描述了一系列“最坏情况”的先验分布，在该分布上渐近PoA最大化。

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